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29 October 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: The NIB/DIN Product Review for the Month of October:  
The View from South/Southeast Asia and Some General  
Thoughts on Product Review

1. As I mentioned to General Wilson during our session with him last Friday, after a month of product review all we can see is the tip of the tip of the iceberg.

2. We have all been keeping a running record of what has been produced in the NIB and DIN during the month of October. From this review we have some idea of the quality and the completeness of day-to-day intelligence reporting. In the case of my South/Southeast Asia review I can make some general, but admittedly subjective, comments:

✓ a. The NIB and DIN provided adequate reportorial coverage of all significant events in my area of review.

✓ b. The DIN, at least as it is presently structured, is an unsatisfactory vehicle for providing information to national consumers. The ad hoc concept of DIN production does not fit the working patterns of the national consumer, i.e. DINs are produced on a 24-hour schedule while most national consumers work on a ten to twelve hour basis. In addition, the "scatter-gun" provision of information of relatively low priority is annoying to the reader, e.g. on 16 October the DIN provided an article on the imminent acceptance by India of an F-class submarine and on 19 October the DIN reported the status of the refit program of the Indian carrier VIKRANT. A preferred product would have been a single item bringing the reader up to date on all the improvements in the Indian navy and what was the significance of these developments.

✓ c. The NIB is generally too long. The average national consumer is both well informed and comes to the NIB already armed with a careful reading of at least the Washington Post and the New York Times. He has a lot of other things on his mind for that day and he wants to know the significant intelligence developments. If one discounts the Monday and Saturday NIB issues (which distort the averages on the down side) the NIB averages almost 17 pages a day.

d. If these 17 pages of the NIB were filled with electric events, there would be no quarrel. -- They are not. I cite a few

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examples admittedly weighted to make my point:

(1) 20 October. Sri Lankan attitudes on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace.

(2) 10 October. Leadership of Philippine Communist Party purported to have surrendered. Later in article you learn that this is a non-issue as the PKP is a moribund organization and the NPA is now carrying the banner of Communism in the Philippines and has been for some years.

(3) 10 October. There will likely be an increase in the insurgency in NE Burma but it will be handled, in all likelihood, with the same care as last year.

In South Vietnam

(4) 23 October. <sup>^</sup>opposition groups are organizing chapters in the provinces but analysis is that public support is small.

e. I would hazard a guess that other area analysts could produce similar examples of unnecessary NIB articles.

f. From my review of one month's production effort the question is raised in my mind -- how do we decide (or do we consciously decide?) where the stress will be placed in our production effort? Outside of the morning panel meeting of the NIB staff, how do we manage intelligence production? Does anyone keep book on it? The unevenness of product production suggests that this is not being done.

✓ g. Are the NIB and DIN products related to the KIQs? -- The answer is yes, -- but. In brief, the South/Southeast Asian KIQs are so broadly worded that almost any subject you write on can in some way be related to the KIQs. Therefore, if we are going to pursue this issue, i.e. how close are KIQs and national products related, we need some kind of scale (perhaps 1 to 10) to subjectively determine the products' true contribution to answering the KIQ.

h. What contribution does the NIB and DIN make to answering the major sub-questions which are the parts of each KIQ? -- My answer is not much. --- In part this is the nature of the art form which is primarily geared to reportorial rather than analytical exposition. The NIB and the DIN were not primarily designed for this purpose. And yet, when a piece is produced in one of these daily products which shows an effort to examine a problem in more depth, the reader reaction is very favorable.

However, as the situation now stands, the NIB and DIN are basically reportorial rather than analytical and their periodicity is still another factor acting against their effectiveness. By this I mean, unless you keep a written running record of what has been produced in the NIB and the DIN (a project only the PRD has hazarded) you are unlikely to recall the details of what was in these products and you are equally unlikely to go to the trouble of finding and sift-

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ing through back copies for that old information.

i. Clearly, there is also a redundancy issue to be looked at. The argument has always been that as the NIB and DIN go to somewhat different audiences, redundancy is not an issue. I'm afraid it can't be ducked that easily. One need only cite the other side of that argument (what about the large element of that audience which is common?) to see that the problem does not go away. When this product review effort is expanded to include products such as the NID, the redundancy matter becomes even bigger.

✓  
how much  
redundancy  
in fact?

j. Another area which product review needs to look into is the entire production process from the daily report to the finished NIE. The more I have gotten into the matter of product review the more I am impressed with how inseparable are the problems of collection guidance, and the centralized direction of both that guidance and of finished intelligence production. I have a very tentative first view on that topic appended as Attachment 1 to this paper.

✓ 3. In summary, after one month I believe that this is an extremely valuable exercise. By going through this admittedly tedious process for a few more months, we will be in an enviable position, i.e. the only ones in the community who really know what is being produced. Based on our review we can render an unbiased judgment of what is quality, what is junk, what is valuable and what is unnecessary production so that real adjustments in the production operation can be made.

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Attachment

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THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM IN PRODUCING IMPROVED  
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

- I believe there is a disconnect in the process of producing national intelligence. Let me outline the problem as I see it.
- The production process gets off to a pretty good start by defining the community's major intelligence problems. As we all know, this is done by two principal mechanisms --- the KIQs and DCID 1/2.
- With this as guidance, producers of intelligence know what their consumers need and don't have. Thus, at the outset of the intelligence cycle, the problem is reasonably well defined.
- Each year --- sometimes several times a year --- the intelligence community takes its definitive swing at the key intelligence questions. The community's best effort is then provided the consumer in the form of a NIE or NIAM.
- However, the critical questions are:
  - How has that NIE/NIAM been arrived at?
  - Between production of NIEs and NIAMs, what have the all-source analysts been provided which assist them in rendering better judgments on their next effort at the key intelligence questions?
  - How are collection requirements determined?
  - How effective is the nexus between the collection and production elements of the community?
- Rather than tackling these questions in generalities, let's take a specific example.
- KIQ 41 states in part, "Will non-Communist elements in Indochina ... be able to maintain internal stability...?"
- In the case of South Vietnam, the question is, of course, is the Thieu government in RVN a viable force capable of maintaining control

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memoranda

being  
addressed  
being  
addressed

over various dissident elements which exist within that country and can it meet the challenges of an economy beset by the threats of international inflation and the NVA/VC insurgency?

- To answer this KIQ, a NIE has been scheduled for production in the coming months.
- As everyone knows, to assist the production analysts who must ultimately tackle this problem, a number of sources of information are made available -- State cables, CIA station reports, Defense Attache messages, SIGINT, open source reporting, etc. These are, in turn, translated into various short term finished intelligence products appearing in various publications such as the NIB, NID, DIN, etc.
- However, when one reviews these finished short term products one is struck by what little help they are in dealing with the major questions posed by the consumer. In brief, these daily intelligence products are helpful to the reader in a reportorial sense --- to stay abreast of the events of a local situation. But they are seldom of value in analyzing the key elements of the problem.
- This is not an attempt to torpedo the daily intelligence products. I have stated my view of these products to make the point that their value is of only limited use in tackling the major intelligence problems.
- If these daily products dove-tailed with a number of more integrated analytical pieces and these in turn led in a logical train to the ultimate production of a NIE/NIAM, one would have little criticism of the national intelligence production process.
- However, the trouble is that the middle link -- the production of

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a number of integrated analytical pieces between the daily product and the NIE -- is not being handled effectively.

- hundreds of articles, memoranda*
- Thus, what I see occurring is national production analysts reviewing traffic on a daily basis and producing essentially reportorial products to meet daily production requirements. Then, when either a crisis hits or a new NIE/NIAM is scheduled the national level production analyst answers the tough integrated KIQ questions primarily by resorting to his general experience, professional background and remembrance of day-to-day occurrences.
- ?*
- What I believe is missing is centralized management and direction of the collection and production process.
- Let's refer again to the Vietnam example. If, in August 1974, you are charged with answering questions concerning the viability and internal stability of the Thieu government --- and you must answer these questions by say, 1 January 1975, it would help a great deal if you required that a series of discrete analytical pieces be provided by 1 December 1974. These pieces might be:

- TRS for NIE's & contributions*
- Department of State. - Provide an integrated analysis of the present attitudes of the An Quang Buddhists, the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects, and the Catholics with respect to their support for the Thieu Regime.
  - Defense Intelligence Agency. - Provide a report on <sup>the</sup> current impact of inflation and the graft/corruption issue on the morale, effectiveness, and support of the RVNAF for the Thieu regime.
  - CIA/State. - Provide a report on problems of urban dissidence and disorder with special attention to students, veterans,

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civil servants, and urban workers.

-- CIA/State. - Provide current analysis of the present impact and likely future trends of the inflation problem.

- Now the usual response to this preceding paragraph is -- "Why, of course, this is being done: We are doing it on a continuing basis. Our entire time is occupied with these issues."
- And, they're right. They are doing this. But by answering my criticism in this manner they are missing my point. What I am saying is that these questions are not being addressed in an intellectually disciplined manner. They are not being addressed on the basis of conscious, official national tasking which precisely defines the problems which collection and production agencies will accomplish and sets deadlines for their production. They are not being done in a way to fully involve the field and the Washington production communities so that discrete, in-depth analytical reports are at hand when the production analyst must tackle the NIE or NIAM.
- Why this is the case involves several matters. First, the NIO, the logical choice to coordinate and direct such an operation, is not adequately manned to accomplish this job. He is working a normal 12-hour day reacting to requirements imposed on him from above and has little time to organize the community's collection and production effort.
- Even if the NIO were manned so that he could carry out this responsibility, his charter does not provide him with the authority to direct the community's efforts. He may ask or request specific assistance. However, unless he has a NSSM response or an NIE deadline, the NIO does not carry sufficient weight to require the production of discrete

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This is the  
essence of  
your argument -  
but no one  
has this  
authority,  
including  
the DCI, so  
you are  
simply fighting the problem

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
reports by DoD, State, CIA, and NSA in preparation for answering KIQs.

- Actually, the production system is driven by each individual agency's perception of what the collection and production requirements are. Each agency makes these determinations which may or may not be the same as the NIO's needs. If they are, it is serendipitous. If they are not, it is unlikely that the NIO will receive a response to his requirements.
- Thus, it all boils down to this. In the last analysis, the NIE/NIAM response to the KIQs are accomplished by seasoned, professional intelligence production analysts who are aware of the background of problems, the long term trends, and can recall the more important details of day-to-day developments of the past couple of months. Based on this, the NIEs and the NIAMs are prepared.
- The production community doesn't come close to tapping the full capabilities of accomplishing in-depth analysis of KIQ related problems. This is due primarily to the fact that the DCI does not really direct the collection and production systems. These systems are principally run by the separate agencies and the DCI taps in to their systems and extracts what information they may have.
- As is the case in all generalities, the above statement can be attacked by resorting to specific examples where the DCI did in fact task and obtain intelligence from the community. However, I submit that examples of this type in no way negate my basic point that the DCI has inadequate control over both the collection and production mechanisms.



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- As usual, criticizing what is wrong is much easier than fixing the problem. What needs to be done is clear. The sticky wicket is, of course, that the needed changes challenge the prerogatives of major departments and agencies. However, I submit that the improvements which will accrue in the form of better intelligence production make joining this battle worthwhile.



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10/15-10/16

OFFICE	INITIALS	DATE	OFFICE	INITIALS	DATE
3 D/DCI/IQ	[initials]		MPRRD		
AD/DCI/IC			CPAD		
EXEC OFF		2	DDN	[initials]	
PD/PLANS			USIB SEC		
SA to AD			Sec Comm		
CS			THC		

ACTION REQUIRED AND ASSIGNED TO:

SUSPENSE DATE:

INFORMATION ONLY

IC Rec / cys. Cys furn: D/IC / AD/IC EO CS/S MPRRD PRD  
CPAD USIB/SEC PD/Plans

Comment:



Dick: Are you including this daily document in your exploratory review?

[initials] 10-16-74

Comment: Gen. Wilson -

No -- we are reviewing the reports, as per your instructions. This particular publication is, in effect, unofficial & preliminary -- thus is not finished intelligence. It may cease publication soon, by the way, as a result of the re-

Comment:

structuring of the Watch Committee. -- Dick 10/16/74

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